

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY Hungary

REPORT

SUBJECT Reorganization of the Hungarian Army

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I. Pre-Reorganization Conditions

Prior to 1948, because of the lack of equipment and other essential supplies, the Hungarian Army had been kept in a deplorable condition. The Soviet troops in Hungary maintained the external security of the nation. However, in the course of 1948, new plans were drawn up by the Hungarian General Staff, consisting of several Hungarian general officers of the Horthy regime who had swung over to the Communist fold. The plan was the reestablishment of the Hungarian Army, shattered in World War II, and reduced in function to border security operations. At the outset, numerous weighty questions arose, which seemed at times insoluble.

A. Reasons for the Reorganization

The paramount reason for the reestablishment of the Hungarian Army was to transform it into the Soviet mold or pattern. This included identical organizational structures and training methods, besides knowledge of the use of Soviet weapons and equipment. In this manner, Hungarian units could serve under Soviet commanders and would know Soviet tactics in the event they took part in common action. It also enabled Hungarian units to be supplied with Soviet materiel.

The Hungarian Army [See Encl. A-17] was planned to consist of seven corps, each covering an area identical to the pre-1945 military divisions of the country. Corps headquarters would be established at the following places

		50X1-HUM
1st Corps	Budapest	
2d Corps	Szekesfehervar	
3d Corps	Szombathely	
4th Corps	Pecs	
5th Corps	Szeged	
6th Corps	Debrecen	
7th Corps	Miskolc	

Each corps [See Encl. A-27] was to consist of the following units:

Corps Staff Section -- 50-60 officers and EM
 Corps QM Section -- 150-200 officers and EM
 One Motorized Inf. Division
 Three Infantry Divisions
 One Air Force Division
 One Tank Division
 One Engineer Division
 One Artillery Division
 One Signal Regiment

In 1948 the plans for the reorganization of the army were completed. Installations to house the corps headquarters were begun.

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C. Methods of Reorganization

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There was a sharp division of opinion on how the change could most efficiently be made. The Hungarian General Staff was opposed to any radical transformation because it felt that it lacked the necessary reliable personnel and the equipment to bring about an abrupt change-over efficiently. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) KIRALY, spokesman for the Hungarian general officers, and the one who had worked on the plan of reorganization, was of the opinion that the reorganization should be taken gradually, organizing, training and equipping smaller Hungarian units, which in turn would supply instructors for the incoming age groups. The Soviet Staff, located in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, objected and insisted that the change be immediate and all-embracing.

With the installation of Gen. FARKAS in 1948 after the Rajk scandal (which also included the release of several top military functionaries who had been occupied with the planning because they allegedly had conspired with TITO) the problem was forthwith decided. Gen. FARKAS decreed that the proposed reorganization go into effect immediately. The reorganization would begin in 1949, and it was scheduled to be completed in 1950.

II. Failure of Planned Reorganization

A. Pre-Plan Conditions

In November 1949 the Hungarian Army consisted of approximately 100,000-120,000 men. The army itself had ~~no~~ armor and very little artillery, consisting essentially of infantry units and Border Guard Bns. The nuclei of the officer corps and the NCO's were made up of unreliable elements, professional soldiers trained under the Horthy regime. In 1947, the 1926 age group had been called in. This was the first military conscription in Hungary since 1945. All inductees of this age group were dispatched to Frontier Guard Bns. A part of the 1927 age group was called in during the 1947-1948 period. They were assigned to Border Guard Bns. in addition to guard functions at the construction sites of old renovated and new military installations. In February and October of 1949 the 1927-1928 age groups were called in. They were the first groups to undergo any Sovietized training, and the preceding age groups were also considered to be unreliable, having recieved training under reactionary conditions.

B. TO/E of Planned Hungarian Army in Time of War

1. Planned Army Strength

As KIRALY mentioned, in event of war the planners had the intention of placing two armies, consisting of approximately 500,000 men each into the field. The army would consist of four corps of about 120,000-130,000 men each, in addition to an army staff of about 150 men and a supply (QM) staff of approximately 500 men.

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a. Army Corps

The army corps of 120,000-130,000 men was planned to consist of three infantry and one motorized infantry divisions, a corps staff of approximately 100 men and a supply staff of about 200 men. Also complementing the corps were an Air Force division, a light tank division, an engineer division, an artillery division, and a signal regiment. The complementary units were broken up among the four divisions composing the army corps, down to the regimental and battalion commands, which were the tactical operational units, and their TO/E will be given separately. For organizational breakdown, See Enclosure A-2.

b. Infantry Division See Enclosure A-3

The total strength of an infantry division was planned to be approximately 25,000 men, and was to include four infantry regiments, an Air Force regiment, an armored regiment, an engineer regiment, Division artillery brigade, and a signal battalion. 50X1-HUM

c. Infantry Regiment

The infantry regiment, the basic tactical operational unit of the new Hungarian Army was to total approximately 3,500 men, and divided into four battalions. See Enclosure A-4 for organizational structure of Regiment.

d. Infantry Battalion

Each infantry battalion was planned to total approximately 880 men, and consisted of a battalion Headquarters unit of six officers and 37 enlisted men, and four rifle companies of approximately 221 men each, and a light MG company See Enclosure A-5

e. Rifle Company

The rifle company consisted of a Headquarters unit of 14 enlisted men, three rifle platoons and a machine pistol platoon, and an additional heavy weapons platoon. Its total strength was to consist of 221 officers and enlisted men. Each rifle platoon included a machine pistol squad. See Enclosure A-7

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2. Complementary (Supporting and Service) Units:

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a. Light Tank Company

The total strength of the company was to be 93 enlisted men and 11 officers, broken down into the following components: Headquarters unit of 21 enlisted men and four platoons of one officer and 20 enlisted men /See Encl. A-9/. Each platoon had three squads of six men each.

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b. Engineer Company /See Enclosure A-10/

The engineer company attached to each rifle regiment totaled approximately six officers and 260 enlisted men. It was divided into four platoons and a Hq. unit of 12 men. Each platoon had four squads which numbered 15 men each. One squad in each platoon was composed of chemical warfare teams, equipped to enter and decontaminate gassed areas.

c. Field Artillery and AAA Batteries

The field artillery battery and the AAA battery consisted of six "half-platoons" (felszakasz) of 20-22 men each. The field artillery battery /See Encl. A-11/ was to be armed with 105 mm. pieces (exact type unknown). Both batteries were to have six guns /See Encl. A-12/.

d. Signal Company /See Enclosure A-13/

The TO/E of this company was misleading because at no time, except in training, would the entire unit be together. However, its personnel, being dispersed throughout the regiment, was administered on the company level, and the CO was found at Regt. Hq. The company itself consisted of seven officers and 228 EM, and was divided into four platoons and a small Hq. unit. The platoons had four squads, each totaling 13 men. Each squad had two radios (type unknown) and two field telephones.

e. Air Reconnaissance Platoon

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the Air Recon. Plat. found at the Battalion command level,
consisted of nine men and three small reconnaissance-type aircraft.

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3. Chain of Command [See Enclosure A-14]

The chain of command seemed rather cumbersome insofar as the complementary units were concerned. Under combat conditions it was quite possible that the duplication of communications would easily cause delay and error, especially in the event that time and speed were of major importance.

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in the new Hungarian Army, Soviet methods were to be employed, and that the Soviet assumption that manpower was expendable, viz. human sea tactics of mass assault, was logically expressed in the chain of command structure.

a. Role of Complementary Units

The commanders of all complementary (service and supporting) units, on and over battalion level of command, were advisors to their respective commanders. In turn, they were the commanders of all units in their respective branches of service, in all lower commands, only insofar as personnel, equipment and training were concerned. At all times, however, the military commander, viz., division, regiment or battalion, had complete authority of all troops operating at his level of command, irrespective of their size or composition. An example can more clearly illustrate the role of the complementary unit commanders in the downward command operations:

The division commander prepares for the crossing of a river to establish a bridgehead on the other side. He communicates his intentions to the regimental commanders involved and at the same time instructs the engr. regt. commander to provide enough engr. troops and equipment to construct a bridge across the aforementioned river. The engr. regt. commander, through his own (communications) channels, dispatches sufficient engr. troops and equipment to construct the bridge. At the same time, the division commander, through his own operations channels, has assigned the additional engr. troops to his subordinate commanders. When and if the bridge is successfully completed, the engr. regt. commander withdraws and reassigns his troops, and at the same time reports to the inf. division commander that the mission has been accomplished. The div. CO then transfers them from their assigned subunit back to the engr. regt. co.

Another example will illustrate the upward chain of command:

An inf. bn. commander had to halt his attack when confronted by a mine field. He decided to have the mines removed and ordered the engr. plat. leader, at his Hq., to remove sufficient mines in order that the inf. troops could continue the attack. The engr. plat. leader, however, does not have sufficient troops or equipment to carry out the bn. commander's order, and informs the latter. The bn. commander relays the message to his regt. commander, and requests that more engineers be dispatched. At the same time the engr. plat. leader nevertheless attempts to carry out the bn. commander's original order, and he has sent, through his own channels of communication, a request to his engr. commander asking for a specified number of engr. troops and equipment to carry

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out his orders. The inf. regt. commander would then instruct the engr. co. commander to send enough engr. troops to bn. hq. for the assigned task. However, the engr. co. commander would have most likely already sent out the necessary engr. troops, if available, to bn. hq. He would have that authority over the engr. troops under his command. If at any time, however, the engr. co. commander wished to send engr. troops to a subordinate command unit, contrary to the regt. commander's plans, the inf. regt. commander had the discretionary authority to forbid it. This would eliminate any conflict of command, but the entire procedure entails a duplication of effort and could involve unnecessary delay.

C. Obstacles

1. 1949 Reorganization Plan

The target of the reorganization plan, i.e., Sovietization of the Hungarian Army, was not achieved in the year ending November 1950. The scope of the plan had been too grandiose, and had failed to solve three fundamental problems.

a. Logistics -- Upon close examination, the planners had found that sufficient equipment was lacking to equip the proposed units to be established and reorganized. Secondly, the new issue of Soviet-type uniforms was not forthcoming in sufficient quantities. Thirdly, the food supply to feed a large number of men created a strain on the Hungarian economy. During the same period of time, food rationing again became necessary, caused by the peasants withholding produce in opposition to collectivization pressures of the government. Also complementing this situation was the withdrawal of a large number of able-bodied young men from the economy into unproductive military pursuits.

b. Administration -- The military records offices in all districts of Hungary were unable to provide adequate data concerning the available manpower for military service. Subsequent to 1945, the military records offices had been understaffed and neglected, their records outdated, and they had lacked sufficient personnel to remedy this bottleneck. This problem was expanded disproportionately because the Communist regime was reluctant to accept reactionary elements into the new Hungarian Army. Quite to the contrary, they were desirous of ridding themselves of professional Horthy-trained soldiers upon whom they nevertheless were obliged to rely at this time. Consequently, kulaks and sons of kulaks and of bourgeois elements were not accepted in 1949.

c. Manpower -- Directly following the administration bottleneck, and partly as a consequence of it, the planners were confronted with a lack of personnel to set up their reorganized army. First, they did not want to induct industrial or factory workers into the new army because this action would defeat the new industrialization program undertaken by the government. The decrease in production would create an economic crisis, and this was to be avoided at all costs. Secondly, kulaks and bourgeois elements, as stated above, were distrusted, and not numerous enough to make up the loss of the industrial element.

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It is no secret that the Communist leadership feared placing guns into the hands of this group because they were totally disaffected, being the primary targets of revolutionary Communism. Finally, the remaining socio-economic group, the small farmer and the landless peasant, were not numerous enough to fulfill the manpower requirements of the plan.

2. Problems in 1950

a. Manpower -- In the course of 1949 and 1950 the manpower problem diminished, but it was not eliminated. By extensive propaganda through all forms of mass media, women were recruited to work in industry. They replaced eligible men who were released for military service or transferred to other jobs where they could release young men for military service. Women became policemen, and were even taken into the Hungarian Army. [redacted] today they number at least 15,000 in the Hungarian Army. /Ref: See Section V. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

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b. Training -- In the field of training, the planners had failed to solve their basic problem: Where to find sufficient qualified instructors to teach the budding Hungarian Army the necessary essentials of Soviet tactics. This problem was not satisfactorily solved, and even today constitutes one of the basic weaknesses of the Hungarian Army.

(1) Lack of Qualified Training Instructors -- Qualified officers and NCO's who knew Soviet tactics, and who were politically reliable besides, were practically non-existent. The Communist leadership did not want soldiers who had been trained under the Horthy regime to become training instructors, firstly, because they were politically unreliable; secondly, because they were not qualified to teach Soviet tactics. Those Hungarian soldiers who had been taken prisoner by the Soviets on the Eastern front, and who had become indoctrinated with Communism, and subsequently fought with the Soviet forces against the retreating German armies, were not numerous enough to supply the need for training instructors. Besides, these men were already in the service of the Communist regime elsewhere.

(2) Training of Officer Instructors -- Beginning in September 1948 when the plans for the new Hungarian Army were being drawn up, 12 to 15 potential Hungarian General Staff officers had been dispatched to Moscow for a three-year course to learn Soviet General Staff methods and procedures. Only four of this group completed the required three years. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] The training given in the Russian language, army organization and staff procedures were on the Soviet pattern. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

The training of Hungarian officers, and in some instances NCO's, in Soviet Russia has become a general practice since 1948, and still remains a continuous operation [REDACTED]

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(3) Training of NCO Instructors -- One of the principal aims of the training program had been the rapid elimination of older professional Hungarian soldiers trained under the Horthy regime. At first they were utilized because there were no others to replace them. In October 1949, the 1927-1928 age groups were called in. They numbered approximately 25,000-30,000 men. They underwent Sovietized training and were to become the future officers and NCO's of the Hungarian Army. During the Summer of 1950, approximately 15,000 reservists had been called up to attend reservist training courses. This group consisted essentially of those who had never had previous military service, and was drawn from the lowest peasant elements. They were selected because they lacked more than four years of elementary schooling, and were deemed to be most susceptible to complete Communist indoctrination. Among them, however, were a few who had had Horthy training, but held no rank above corporal, and had since proven themselves to be ardent champions of Communism.

This group attended two-month courses in camps. They were taught by Horthy-trained instructors and were then made instructors themselves upon completion of their training and awarded high rank. The most apt among them became officers. Subsequently, the unreliable Horthy-trained instructors were progressively discharged and this group replaced them. Needless to say, the efficiency and competence of these instructors could never compete with the Horthy-trained men, and still today remains one of the weak points of the Hungarian Army, although to some degree ameliorated by the passage of time and the accumulation of more experience.

III. Alleged Completion of Reorganization

A. Completion of Military Records

One of the indications that the 1949 reorganization plan had been completed, at least on the administrative level, was the fact that every Hungarian, after demobilization, received his Military Book in the course of 1951. All reservists had been registered and their status determined. Because the new Hungarian Army is essentially composed of reservists, the issuance of Military Books to all males to the age of 60 who will constitute the fighting force in event of another war, 50X1-HUM very strongly indicates that 90% of the original reorganization insofar as manpower was concerned, had been accomplished. [REDACTED]

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B. Equipment

Presently, the Hungarian Army has sufficient equipment for training purposes, although most of it is obsolete. In any event, almost all military equipment would necessarily be supplied by the Soviet Union which has the stocks and the industrial potential to equip the Hungarian Army. The old Hungarian Army uniforms have been replaced by Soviet-type uniforms, and this aspect of transformation has been completed.

C. Military Installations

Beginning in 1949, the Hungarian Army had undertaken the reconstruction and renovation of old military installations. Many were transformed from pre-war cavalry installations to accommodate modern mechanized equipment. At the same time, the construction of many new military installations was begun, which [] were completed, 50X1-HUM for the most part, in 1951.

D. Training

The training of the Hungarian Army has progressively improved as the new age groups have been called in, and the instructors have gained experience. Although the effectiveness of the training has left much to be desired, there has definitely been an improvement, and the disaffected Horthy-trained element has been totally eliminated from the Hungarian Army.

IV. Future Plans

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A. Reserves

The backbone of the Hungarian Army remains the reserves, especially those who have become trained in Soviet methods and tactics. For economic reasons Hungary cannot maintain a large standing army, and therefore has strived to maintain well-organized and well-trained reserves. Military technicians are periodically called to attend summer refresher courses, and to learn the operations and nomenclature of new weapons and equipment.

B. Training

In the building of the Defense Ministry, [] in 50X1-HUM April 1952 [] all Hungarian males 40 years and 50X1-HUM uncer, viz., the 1913-1928 age groups inclusive, would undergo a two-month training course during 1952. This was designed to teach the older members of the group the new methods and tactics introduced during the reestablishment of the present Sovietized Hungarian Army. At the same time, it would bring the "forgotten" 1924-1925 age groups into the reservist program. Equally on par with the military training would be the attempted political indoctrination of these groups.

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In June 1952, [redacted] all Hungarian males between the ages of 41 to 60 years inclusive, would be called in for a similar two-month training course during 1953. The training of these groups during 1952 and 1953 would be held out in the field.

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V. Progressive Growth of the Hungarian Army

A. Pre-1948

After World War II, the Hungarian Army consisted essentially of Frontier Guard Bns. located in the same installations and areas of the pre-1945 era. Its personnel, for the most part, were professional veteran soldiers, trained under the Horthy regime. Enough applicants were available that no military conscription was necessary to supply the personnel necessary for the Frontier Guard Forces. Besides, Soviet occupation authorities forbade it. Some infantry training was given to the men volunteering for Frontier Guard service, but this was essentially of basic training nature.

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In 1947, the total strength of the Hungarian Army consisted of approximately 20,000 men. [redacted]

B. 1948 Expansion

After the March 1947 coup d'etat of the Hungarian Communists, and with Soviet approval, plans were formulated to reorganize the Hungarian Army. The planning was then progressing in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense by Hungarian General Staff officers. The basic conflict between the Hungarian staff officers, numbering approximately five colonels and generals, was the opposition to the Soviet desire to rapidly transform the Hungarian Army into the Soviet pattern [see Section I, Paragraph C of this memo]. This conflict was resolved when Gen. FARKAS became Defense Minister, immediately following the Cominform (Soviet) split with TITO. Gen. FARKAS decreed that the Hungarian Army would forthwith be expanded as rapidly as possible. The new Soviet TO/E would serve as the guidepost for the expansion. In the Autumn of 1948, after the remainder of the 1926-1927 age groups had been called in, and with the increase due to the recall of some reservists, [redacted] the Hungarian Army totalled approximately 50,000 officers and men. [redacted]

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C. Program of 1949

In November 1949, the 1928-1929 age groups had been called in, adding approximately 35,000 more men to the 1948 total. which had been retained. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

[redacted] In the same year, the Hungarian military academies had started graduating very large numbers of officers, after completing three to six-month courses. To supplement these numbers, military reservists with specialist qualifications were called in to establish training cadres in the various specialized technical units of the Hungarian Army which were then being constituted. In totalling the above figures, [redacted] the Hungarian Army, including the Frontier Guards would number approximately 100,000 men. [redacted] 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

D. 1950 Increase

In the Fall of 1950, the remainder of the 1929 age group and the 1930 age group were called in. The military academies continued to graduate large numbers of new officers and large groups of reservists were periodically called throughout the year. Women volunteers were accepted, although not in great number, and were formed into signal units, also assigned to miscellaneous administrative tasks. The NCO training program (volunteers) was established. In totalling all the new additions, [redacted] the Hungarian Army in November 1950 numbered approximately 125,000 men. Also during 1950, it was decreed that all "arms-bearing personnel", i.e., police, customs officials, AVH, firemen, and prison guards would, in event of national emergency, be incorporated into the Hungarian armed forces and come under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. The total strength of the above-mentioned units, [redacted] would total approximately 40,000 men and women [redacted] 50X1-HUM 50X1-HUM

E. 1951 Stabilization

In October 1951, most of the 1927 age group was released and assigned an active reserve status (recall at any time, for any length of time). At the same time, a part of the 1928 age group was also released, but the 1931 age group was called in. The female component was increased, and the total strength of the Hungarian Army in November 1951 was approximately 140,000 individuals. [redacted] 50X1-HUM

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The total active military personnel in training units and in administrative positions had now become established. This coincided with the alleged completion of the 1949 reorganization plan, transforming the Hungarian Army into the Soviet pattern. Also during the course of 1951, the Hungarian Frontier Guard forces had been strengthened, and now totalled approximately 60,000 men, an unprecedented number in Hungarian military history.

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F. 1952 Strength

The remainder of the 1928 group, and most of the 1929 age group was scheduled to be released in October 1952.

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During the course of 1952, the female component of the Hungarian Army was increased, [redacted] totalled at least 15,000 personnel. Due for induction in November 1952 was the 1932 age group, which would bring the present active strength of the Hungarian Army to approximately 145,000 men and women.

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In addition to the above-mentioned active component of the Hungarian Army, throughout 1952 the "forgotten" 1924-1925 age groups and all physically qualified men 40 years and under (1913-1928 age groups inclusive) underwent basic training or refresher courses of two months duration. On 1 March 1952, [redacted] in Miskolc, [redacted] the induction of approximately 8,000 men for the two-month training course. Miskolc is the most populated of the 18 Military Records Offices in Hungary. For the remaining 17, a figure of 4,000-5,000 inductees would be a very conservative estimate. Together, the approximate total for the entire country in March 1952 was approximately 70,000 men. Multiplied by six for each two-month period in 1952, the total number of men who allegedly underwent training in 1952 was approximately 420,000.

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The training of the above-mentioned men was held in the field and as one group left, the other arrived.

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The purpose of the training was to instruct the men, most of whom had served in the pre-1945 Hungarian Army, in Soviet tactics, organization and equipment. It was also designed to begin indoctrinating these elements with a new esprit de corps glorifying Hungarian military tradition by associating it, through political lectures and propaganda methods, with the magnificent achievements of the Soviet Red armies during World War II.

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G.. Future Expansion

[redacted] the standing Hungarian Army would not appreciably increase beyond its present strength. Its essential character is a reservist army, and unless an emergency arises, it will remain at approximately 150,000 men and women. In December 1951, [redacted] the complementary (supporting and service) components of the Hungarian Army were to be expanded. [redacted]

[redacted] The principal preoccupation of all Hungarian military units was to retain the intensive training of new recruits, and the introduction of modern Soviet weapons and equipment which presently is lacking [redacted]

Besides the above plans of the Hungarian Army, [redacted]

[redacted] one of the long-range plans of the Hungarian Army was to have retrained by December 1954 all men up to and including the age of 60. The 40 years and under group was to be called in during 1952, as given above, and the remaining older men, during 1953. The periodic call-up of reservists was to continue, and the training of new conscriptees to become more thorough and intensive.

Attachments:

- A-1. Hungarian Army Organization
- A-2. Organization of a Hungarian Army Corps
- A-3. Organization of a Hungarian Infantry Division
- A-4. Organization of a Hungarian Infantry Regiment
- A-5. Organization of a Hungarian Infantry Battalion
- A-6. T/O&E of a Light MG Company
- A-7. T/O&E of a Hungarian Rifle Company
- A-8. T/O&E of a Heavy Weapons Company
- A-9. T/O&E of a Tank Company
- A-10. T/O&E of an Engineer Company
- A-11. T/O&E of a Field Artillery Battery
- A-12. T/O&E of AAA Battery
- A-13. T/O&E of a Signal Company
- A-14. Chain of Command Structure


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SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure A-1

HUNGARIAN ARMY ORGANIZATION



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
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Enclosure A-2


Orgn of Hungarian Army Corps



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Enclosure A-3

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
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Enclosure A-4

Orgn of Hungarian Inf Regt

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ALREADY COUNTED
UNDER DIVISION
BREAKDOWN


ACCORDING
TO PLANNED
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Enclosure 1-6

Orgn of Hungarian 1st Bn


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THE COMPLEMENTARY UNITS ARE LISTED HERE WHICH WILL USUALLY BE ASSIGNED TO EACH BN, THIS ILLUSTRATES THEIR DISPOSITION, HAVING ALREADY BEEN COUNTED UNDER DIV BREAKDOWN.

Enclosure 16

T/O&E of Light

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
Total strength of Co: approx 7 officers and 160 EM

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Enclosure A-7

T/Os of Hungarian Rifle Co

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SECURITY INFORMATION



Note: The machine pistol platoon is identical in strength to the rifle platoon. The only difference being that they are armed with machine pistols, where the other members of the rifle platoon had rifles. However, the platoon was not a separate unit, and one machine pistol sqd was assigned to each rifle platoon. Each platoon was therefore to consist of 1 machine pistol sqd and 3 rifle sqds.


SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure A-3

T/O of Heavy weapons Co

SECURITY INFORMATION

1st Sgt
Clerk
up NCO
Food NCO
Med NCO
Finance NCO
2 Medics
1 driver
3 cooks
2 messengers
4 messmen
1 Artificer




Total strength: 6 officers and 190

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure R-9

* / ONE of Tank Company

SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION**

Total number of Tanks: 12 (type unknown; probably light tanks)
Total strength: 11 officers and 93 AM


SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION**

Enclosure #10

T/O&E of Engineer Company

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION



One squad in each platoon equipped to combat and decontaminate gassed areas,
having special rubberized clothing.
Each platoon also has one messenger

Total strength: 6 officers and 260 MM

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
SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure *Ref*

Type of Field Artillery Battery

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION



Total strength of battery: 7 officers and 136 EM
Weapon-105 mm arty piece (6 guns)

SECRET


SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure A-2

T/O&E of AAA Battery

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SECURITY INFORMATION



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50X1-HUM


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SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure #13

T/O&E of Signal Company



Each platoon has one messenger
Total strength of company: 7 officers and 223 EM

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Enclosure 1-14

Chain of Command Structure


SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

Military OperationsComplementary Units

Military Commanders

Commanders of Complementary Units
USUALLY ASSIGNED TO CORRESPONDING
MILITARY COMMANDERS.



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

50X1-HUM